




























The paper investigates the effect of local electoral rules on the political participation of the residents, as 
reflected in voter turnout. It focuses on Italy, where municipal voting schemes are differentiated by the size 
of the city: a single ballot system applies to municipalities with less than 15,000 inhabitants, while a dual 
ballot system is in place above that threshold. By exploiting this discontinuity, the paper finds that the dual 
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1. Introduction 
 
An extensive body of research documents that higher political and civic engagement is associated with more 
successful economic outcomes (see Guiso et al., 2010, Hall and Jones, 1999, and Knack and Kiefer, 1997).
1 
Much less is known, however, about the mechanisms through which political participation can be spurred. A 
potential key channel goes from the electoral institutions to the civic engagement of the residents. Some 
types of voting rules might spur political participation by promoting greater accountability of the 
government; others, however, might prevent citizens from exercising influence on policy makers, thus 
discouraging residents’ involvement in political issues (Packel, 2008).
2  
 
This paper aims to shed light on the role of electoral institutions in political and civic engagement. We focus 
on a particular feature of an electoral system: the dual ballot scheme. Under a dual ballot (or runoff), voters 
cast two sequential votes. First, they vote on who stands for election. The two candidates who obtain more 
voters are then allowed to compete again in a second round, which defines the winner. By contrast, under a 
single ballot rule the winning candidate is selected in the first round.
3 We test whether the dual ballot rule 
spurs political participation. We do so in a quasi-experimental framework offered by the institutional setup 
that characterizes Italy’s municipalities: since 1993 there are two different electoral schemes according to the 
size of the city. A single ballot applies to municipalities with less than 15,000 inhabitants, while a dual ballot 
is in place above that threshold. This allows us to exploit a sharp change in the exposure to the dual ballot 
rule to identify a causal effect trough a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD).  
 
Our measure for political participation is voter turnout, that is the percentage of eligible voters who actually 
cast their vote. As the strength of engagement with the voting process is considered to be vital to sustaining a 
healthy democracy, voter turnout is a widely used measure of civic commitment (Downs, 1957; Fowler, 
2006). As an individual vote cast in an election conceivably has a negligible effect on its outcome, in 
presence of cost of going to the polls, a rational individual who is not interested in the common good should 
abstain from voting.
4 Note, however, that voter turnout can be a misleading proxy of the individual interest 
in the common good, to the extent that it leads to personal patronage benefits (“exchange voting”). 
 
 
1 Involvement in the institutions of civic or political society is one possible form of social capital. Others include 
networks of relationships (Coleman, 1990, Fukuyama, 1995, and Putnam, 2000. However, it is unclear whether these 
are a good or a bad thing from the point of view of society (see Bourdieu, 1972). 
2 Very close to the spirit of this paper, Putnam (1993) argues that local systems of government have a paramount role in 
explaining the differences in civic engagement across Italian territories. In particular, it was the local political regimes 
in place in Italy in the middle ages that shaped the degree of local civicness that persisted through the centuries (see also 
de Blasio and Nuzzo, 2010). 
3 See Cox for a survey on different examples of runoff elections.  
4 After increasing for many decades, there has been a trend of decreasing voter turnout in most established democracies 
over the last 40 years. Italy is no exception: abstentionism at the Parliamentary elections, which was slightly above 5 
percent at the beginning of the 1970s, steadily increased up to almost 20 percent in the 2008 election. Nevertheless, 
voter turnout in Italy is still one of the highest by international comparison.  
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Moreover, the proximity between voters and elected officials in the local elections could magnify this 
negative trait. To make sure that our measure is not capturing immediate personal benefits of voting, we 
focus on participation in a nationwide electoral context (the Parliamentary elections), which can reasonably 
be assumed a patronage-free measure of civic c
 
Our results show that the causal effect of the dual ballot is that of increasing the political participation of 
residents. The magnitude of the effect is estimated at between 1 and 3 percentage points, providing important 
suggestions for the design of institutions.  
 
Why should the difference between single and dual ballot matter for political participation and voter turnout? 
The existing literature has never explored this link. Nevertheless, political scientists have long speculated 
that the electoral system could be important in determining the percentage of people going to the polls. They 
are, however, divided over what system delivers a higher participation rate (see Katz, 1997). For instance, 
proportional systems might foster participation, as any voter can be sure they will be represented in the 
assembly.
5 They could also deter participation, insofar they are more likely to produce multiparty (coalition) 
governments, which reflects not only the will of the voters but also the result of political deal-making (see 
Blais and Carty, 1990). On similar grounds, Franklin (2004) argues that salience – the perceived effect that 
an individual vote will have on how the municipality is run – could be relevant for turnout. In this regard, a 
competition between two candidates (as in a runoff) increases salience, especially when a small swing in 
votes can be decisive for the choice of mayor. In the political science literature, single and dual ballots have 
been compared with respect to their implications for the number of participants in the political competition. 
Osborne and Silvinsky (1996), and Wright and Riker (1989), emphasize that because it weakens the 
incentives for political entities to merge, the dual ballot should be featured by a higher number of parties 
compared to the single ballot.
6 Again, the consequences of a higher number of parties on the political 
participation of residents remain ambiguous. For instance, a higher number of parties might broaden political 
representation. However, it could also encourage the formation of governments away from the will of the 
electorate (and decrease salience). In the economic literature single and dual ballots have been analyzed for 
their fiscal policy effects (see Chamon et al., 2008, and Bordignon et al., 2010). For our purposes, it is 
interesting to note that the theoretical model of Bordignon et al. (2008) predicts that the runoff system leads 
to a higher utility for voters because their preferences are better translated in policy outcomes.  
 
 
5 Contrariwise, majoritarian schemes might impact negatively on turnout when the majority of the seats are deemed to 
be “safe”. In this case, supporters of minority parties will rarely see their candidates elected while supporters of the 
majority parties will also be disinclined to vote because their party has already amassed sufficient votes to win the 
election by a comfortable margin. 
6 This can be illustrated with the help of a simple example, taken from Chamon et al. (2008). Consider a single ballot 
and suppose that 60% of the electorate is left-leaning. If there is only one left-leaning and one right-leaning party 
contesting the election, the former should easily win. If there are, however, two competing left-leaning parties, the 
right-leaning one may be able to achieve a relative majority. In this case, under the single ballot the two left-leaning 
parties should get together and support a single candidate. Under a dual ballot, conversely, the presence of two left-
leaning candidates should not affect the final outcome and therefore a higher supply of candidates is warranted.  
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Finally, our paper is related, to a lesser extent, to some recent contributions that explore the determinants of 
social capital. For instance, Carden et al. (2009) study the effect of the exposure to Wal-Mart on various 
proxies of social behavior, while Olken (2009) shows that television and radio in Indonesia lead to less 
participation in social organizations and lower self-reported trust.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the electoral systems in Italy’s municipalities. Section 
3 explains the methodology used to identify the causal effect of electoral rules. Section 4 illustrates the 
outcome variable. Section 5 presents the empirical evidence; first it substantiates the empirical design, then it 
provides the results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Municipal electoral systems in Italy 
 
Up to 1993, Italy’s municipalities had a system of proportional representation which at that time also 
featured electoral rules at the national level.
7 People voted for local parties/lists and councillors. Both the 
mayor and the members of the mayor’s cabinet (assessori) were selected by the council from their own 
ranks. As highlighted by many (see, for instance, Agosta, 1999 and Vandelli, 1997) the system of 
proportional representation was a major impediment for the good governance of Italy’s municipalities. To 
overcome these difficulties, on 25 March 1993 the Italian Parliament approved Law 81, also known as the 
Law for the direct election of the mayors.  
 
Irrespective of the size of the municipality, the new framework envisaged that (i) residents vote directly for 
who they want to be mayor; (ii) the mayor can appoint and dismiss the assessori, who can also be recruited 
from outside the council. Crucially, the reform envisaged different electoral rules according to the size of the 
municipality:  
 
- Below the threshold of 15,000 inhabitants, a single ballot applies. The candidate who wins the relative 
majority in the single election is appointed mayor. Under this scheme, each candidate for the seat of mayor 
can be backed by one list only and there is a substantial victory bonus: the list supporting the winner gets 
two-thirds of the seats in the council, while the rest of the seats are assigned to the remaining lists according 
to a criterion of proportionality. 
 
- Above the threshold of 15,000 inhabitants, a dual ballot applies. Under this scheme, each candidate can be 
backed by a number of lists instead of just one. There is no direct link between lists and mayoral candidates: 
 
 
7 However, very small municipalities (with less than 5,000 residents) had a majoritarian system.  
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voters can split their vote by opting for one mayoral candidate and a list associated with a different candidate 
(disjoint vote).
8 If a candidate obtains an absolute majority (that is, over 50% of the votes cast) he or she 
become the mayor; if no candidate wins an absolute majority, then those ranked first and second in the vote 
go to a second round, in which they can seek the support of lists whose candidates have been eliminated. 
After the mayor has been appointed, the council is elected. If the lists supporting the wining candidate have 
received over 50% but less than 60% of the votes, then they receive 60% of the seats in the Council; 
otherwise, seats are assigned by the criterion of proportionality.
9 
 
The establishment of two different municipal electoral systems is explained by budgetary reasons. Compared 
to the single ballot, the dual ballot entails substantial extra outlays, as the fixed costs for the polls and the 
counting process basically double. Therefore, in an effort to minimize the impact on public finance for small 
towns, it was decided to apply a single ballot scheme to municipalities with less than 15,000 inhabitants.  
 
In 1994 the new rules began to be implemented gradually, according to the schedule for the new elections 





Our goal is to evaluate whether variations in local electoral rules make a difference to the participation of 
citizens at elections. As explained above, Italian municipal electoral rules are differentiated by the size of the 
city. A single ballot applies to municipalities of below 15,000 inhabitants, while a dual ballot system is in 
place above that cutoff. We exploit this discontinuity to investigate the causal impact of local electoral rules 
on voter turnout. In principle, different sized municipalities can vary in terms of many unobserved 
characteristics that can be correlated with measures of political participation. For instance, urban proximity 
might have a positive effect on civic engagement by facilitating interactions in political community matters 
(see Glaeser, 2004 and Borck, 2006) irrespective of the local electoral rules. Conversely, larger areas can be 
characterized by a greater degree of opportunistic behaviour (Putnam, 2000): if urban areas facilitate social 
flight, then it may be easy for urbanites to behave opportunistically and escape punishment. Similarly, large 
communities might display weaker social control over the civic duties of the residents, as explained by Funk 
(forthcoming) in the analysis of voting behaviour in the Swiss Cantons. Again, this (negative) impact of the 
size of the municipality on social behaviour might have nothing to do with the electoral schemes. By 
 
 
8 Voters can also abstain in the election for the council, voting only for the mayoral candidate. However, voting only 
one list automatically implies a preference for the mayoral candidate supported by that list. 
9 For a mayoral candidate who is elected in the second round, the 60% bonus is only granted if no other coalition got at 
least 50% of the votes in the first round. Since there is the option of a disjoint vote, in principle this possibility could 
arise. applying a regression discontinuity design (RDD), we are able to differentiate between all the characteristics 
that may confound the identification of the causal effect of local electoral rules.  
 
The main idea behind this research design (Angrist and Lavy, 1999; Black, 1999; and Van der Klaauw, 
2002) is that municipalities just below the cutoff size (with a single ballot) make good comparisons with 
those just above the cutoff (where the dual ballot applies). This strategy is deemed preferable to other non-
experimental methods because (see Lee, 2008) if the units of the analysis (in our case the Italian 
municipalities) are unable to manipulate precisely the forcing variable (their size), the variation in treatment 
(changes in local electoral rules) around the threshold is randomized as though in a randomized experiment 
(as if the municipalities had been randomly drawn just below or just above the threshold).  
 
One implication of the local randomized result is that RDD can be tested like randomized experiments. If the 
variation in the treatment near the threshold is approximately randomized, it follows that all “baseline 
covariates” – all those variables determined prior to the realization of the forcing variable – should have the 
same distribution just above and just below the cutoff. Section 5.1 presents a test for the absence of 
discontinuity in baseline characteristics around the threshold that substantiates the empirical strategy. It also 
shows that beyond the move from single to dual ballot, no other policy variation occurs at the cutoff. 
Therefore, our results can be attributed to the sole effect of the changes in the local electoral rules 
documented in Section 2.  
 
The causal effect of the local electoral rules is assessed by allowing the outcome variables to be functions of 
the size of the city and testing the existence of discontinuities in the intercept at the threshold. Operationally, 
we adopt a parametric approach fitting a highly flexible functional form. We will be running regressions of 
the following type: 
  m m m m Z g T Y            ( 1 )  
where Ym is our measure of political participation in municipality m; Zm = POPm – 15,000 represents the 
forcing variable; Tm is a treatment dummy that takes on the value of 1 if Zm ≥ 0 and 0 otherwise;
10 g (·) is a 
higher order polynomial function in the forcing variable; and m is the random error. β is the average 
treatment effect of electoral rules on voter turnout and can be interpreted as the jump between the two 




ˆ lim ˆ lim ˆ
0 0
   
    
that is, the difference at the limit of the estimated outcome, as the forcing variable approaches the cutoff 
from the right and the left, respectively. As is well known, RDD estimates can be highly sensitive to the 




10 Two regions with a special status adopted different thresholds: 5,000 inhabitants for Friuli-Venezia Giulia and 10,000 
inhabitants for Sicily: in these cases Z is accordingly defined.  
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specification of the functional form of g (·). In the empirical section, an extensive robustness analysis will 
deal with this issue. 
 
 
4. The measure of political participation 
 
Our measure of political participation is voter turnout. As a proxy for the strength of civic engagement, this 
measure has two important advantages. First, it is an outcome-based measure. Thus, it is not affected by 
social desirability issues that bias the measures collected through surveys. Second, as explained by Guiso et 
al (2010), this measure correlates well with the other well-known proxy of how much people internalize the 
common good, namely blood donations. However, unlike blood donation, voter turnout is available at a very 
detailed level of geographic stratification (municipalities), thus allowing the analysis of phenomena that are 
of a local nature. 
 
Alongside important advantages, there are also drawbacks. First, to qualify as a good indicator of citizens’ 
involvement in issues of general relevance, voter turnout should be unaffected by legal enforcement. As in 
some countries, but not in others, it is a legal duty to participate in elections, cross-country comparisons are 
probably highly biased by the different degrees of legal enforcement. This issue does not apply in our case: 
we compare municipalities within the same country where, above all, there is no legal obligation to 
participate.  
 
Second and more importantly, voting can lead to personal patronage benefits. It might be an opportunity to 
obtain immediate personal benefits; that is, an “exchange” and not a measure of civic involvement. We are 
particularly concerned that this issue can affect our results. The tradition of “exchange” voting in Italy has 
been quite strong in the not so distant past (see Chang, 2005). Moreover, local elections are competitions in 
which the potential for patronage-driven voting is clearly maximized, given the proximity between voters 
and elected officials. In these cases voter turnout at a municipality election is an “erroneous” measure of 
local political engagement, the error being a proxy for local corruption. However, to the extent that the 
measurement error is not correlated to the treatment Tm it would only result in a larger error variance. 
Unfortunately, there are good arguments against this being the case, since electoral rules are likely to 
correlate to corruption (Persson et al.; 2003). To circumvent this drawback and to make sure that our 
measure of participation is capturing nothing else than the individual interest in the common good, we focus 
on political participation at the Parliamentary elections of 2001, rather than that at the municipality elections. 
That is, the impact on voter turnout of the variations in local electoral rules is measured in a nationwide 
electoral context, other than the one in which it originated. At the Parliamentary elections the scope for 
corruption-driven voting is reduced from the abolition of preference voting since 1993. Therefore we 
empirically estimate whether electoral rules have a persistent effect on voters’ behaviour which survives in a  
  8
                                                
different voting context. As shown in Table 1, the average (across the 8,068 Italian municipalities) voter 





In this section, we present empirical evidence that substantiates the validity of our identification strategy and 
provide the estimation results for the effect of local electoral rules on voter turnout.  
 
5.1 Substantiating the empirical design 
First, the RDD framework relies on the fact that municipalities cannot manipulate their size in order to get a 
preferred electoral rule applied to them. In our case this requirement is trivially verified: the threshold was 
decided in 1993; at that time it was also decided that the reference population was the one resulting from the 
1991 Census. Moreover, the Census is independently run by the National Statistical Office. Finally, even if 
one accepts that manipulation was feasible, it is not clear why this should have occurred as there was no 
identifiable advantage from the municipality’s perspective. In any case, we investigate the smoothness of our 
forcing variable (population size) around the 15,000 threshold. Figure 1 plots the frequency of municipalities 
whose distance from the cutoff is less than 10,000 inhabitants, using different bin sizes (250 and 500 
inhabitants). The distribution is positively skewed and a visual inspection reveals a small positive increase in 
the probability mass after the threshold. At any rate, the hypothesis of non-random sorting around the cutoff 
is rejected on the basis of the McCray (2008) test.
11 
 
Second, discontinuities in the outcomes at the threshold can be unambiguously attributed to the role of local 
electoral rules only if no other policy variations occur at the cutoff. This is a reason for concern, as many 
other regulatory changes for the Italian municipal institutions are implemented as a function of the size of the 
city.
12 Table 2 shows the changes occurring at various thresholds. They mainly refer to the remunerations of 
the representatives (mayor, members of the cabinet, members of the council) and the size of the political 
bodies. Crucially, at the threshold of 15,000 inhabitants no other change occurs beyond that of local electoral 
rules.  
 
Third, we examine whether observed baseline covariates are locally balanced on either side of the cutoff to 
substantiate the idea that the assignment of the treatment near the cutoff is approximately randomized. The 
regression discontinuity framework provides a natural framework to check whether some confounding factor 
is driving some spurious correlation. It suffices to run RDD regressions (of the type in equation (1) above) 
 
 
11 Results are available from the authors. 
12 They were mostly introduced in the second half of the 1990s.  
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using as dependent variables those factors that the researcher suspects could be driving the results. If no 
effect is detected then that variable can be considered as controlled for in the RDD exercise. We focus on 
three characteristics that should capture most of the municipality heterogeneity: a dummy variable equal to 
one if the municipality is located in the South of Italy (where socio-economic development is significantly 
lower); GDP per capita in 1994; and the 1991 share of employees in the non-profit sector, which proxies for 
pre-treatment civicness (descriptive statistics are depicted in Table 1). The results are shown in Table 3. For 
each dependent variable, both the full sample of about 8,000 municipalities and a restricted sample around 
the cutoff are considered. As in Lalive (2008), the bandwidth (± 12,800 inhabitants) for the restricted sample 
is heuristically chosen to obtain a sample size of about one half of the full sample. The probability of being 
located in the South is not different for treated and untreated municipalities (Columns 1 and 2). Analogously, 
no jump occurs at the threshold as to the degree of economic development (Columns 3 and 4). Finally, we 
find evidence that the degree of local civicness is not randomized around the cutoff (Column 5) which, 
however, does not survive when the restricted sample is considered (Column 6). As explained by Lee and 
Lemieux (2009), some of the differences in covariates across the threshold might be statistically significant 
by random chance. To check for this possibility, we combine the multiple tests into a single test statistic that 
measure whether data are broadly consistent with the random treatment hypothesis around the cutoff. Table 4 
presents the results we obtain by estimating Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) where each equation 
represents a different baseline covariate. A 
2 test for discontinuity gaps in all the equations being zero is 
strongly supported by data for both samples. 
 
5.2 Estimating the effects of local electoral rules on voter turnout 
We start by presenting some graphical evidence for the discontinuity of voter turnout at the 15,000 cutoff. 
Figure 2 we show the mean of the outcome variable for municipalities whose distance from the cutoff is less 
than 10,000 inhabitants, using different binsizes (250 and 500 inhabitants). The figure superimposes the fit of 
a linear regression allowing for a discontinuity at the cutoff. The figure strongly suggests that dual ballot 
elections induce a larger voter turnout. 
 
Next, we turn to more formal measures of the effect of the electoral rules. Table 5 presents the RDD impact 
of the change in electoral rules at the threshold on voter turnout at a Parliamentary election. The reported 
coefficient represents the average treatment effect of the dual ballot rule compared with the single ballot one 
(standard errors are robust to unknown heteroskedasticity). Column 1 reports the raw mean differences 
(estimated by fitting a polynomial of order 0) at the cutoff for the voter turnout in the full sample of 8,017 
municipalities. There is a statistically significant positive jump amounting to 2.2 percent. Then, we present 
the results from polynomial specifications of increasing order (from Column 2 to Column 5). In all the 
specifications we find a positive and significant effect, ranging from 1.2 percent (Column 5) to 2.2 percent 
(Column 2). The economic magnitude of the effect of the dual ballot is non-negligible, ranging from 1/10 to 
1/5 of the standard deviation of the dependent variable.   
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Table 6 presents a number of robustness checks. Column 1 reports the results we obtain by augmenting the 
specification of Table 5, Column 5 (the most conservative one) with a number of covariates (we include the 
variables depicted in Tables 3 and 4 above). As discussed by Lee and Lemieux (2009), because of its local 
randomized experiment nature it is not necessary to include in a RDD setting additional controls to obtain 
consistent estimates. However, doing so might reduce the sample variability in the estimator. As a matter of 
fact, our results show that the inclusion of the additional controls slightly increases the point estimate, while 
the gain in precision is very modest. Column 2 restricts the estimation sample by about one half of the full 
sample (we trim the observation outside the bandwidth of ± 12,800 inhabitants around the cutoff). While 
remaining highly significant, the point estimate increases to 3.5 percent. Column 3 considers a placebo 
experiment. We estimate the effect of local electoral rules – which readers will recall were gradually 
introduced starting from 1994 – on voter turnout at the Parliamentary election of 1994. As this outcome 
predates the reform of local electoral rules, we should fail to find any effect. This is exactly what happens. 
Finally, we estimate the effect of local electoral rules at fake thresholds. These are again placebo 
experiments, as no treatment takes place at fake thresholds. Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008) in 
Column 4 we consider the sub-sample with a population of less than 15,000 and test for a jump at the median 
of the forcing variable (2,049 inhabitants). Column 3 shows the result of the analogous exercise using the 
sub-sample to the right of the cutoff point (median = 27,036). In both cases, treatment effects are never 





How to spur political and civic engagement is a crucial question. By focusing on the Italian case, where 
municipal electoral rules are differentiated by the size of the city, this paper investigates the effect of voting 
schemes at the local level on the political participation of the residents. 
 
The results show that one set of electoral rules – the dual ballot – increases the political participation of 
citizens. The estimated impact on voter turnout has a non-negligible magnitude. The exact mechanism 
thorough which this effect has materialized goes beyond the scope of this paper; it is left for further 
investigation. However, we note that the positive implications of the dual ballot for involving residents in 
issues of general relevance could well be explained by a wider political representation compounded with an 
increased salience. It could have also been the case that the discouraging effect, due to the presence of  
  11
                                                




A major caveat is in order. Our identification strategy delivers a highly credible effect of local electoral rules 
for the sub-population of municipalities close to the threshold. Away from the threshold, the RDD 
identification can be much less informative. Needless to say, the possibility of extrapolating our results in 











13 Romanelli (1995, p. 185) explains that “the first elections with the new scheme in some large cities – among the first 
ones, Milan, Genoa, Venice, Rome, Naples and Palermo – have, in effect, experienced the rise of personalities outside 
of political circles, in some cases with nationwide prestige.”  Taking stock of Italy’s 2001 municipal elections in the 103 
provincial capitals, Baldini (2002, p. 375) observes that “the dual ballot resulted in voters having more influence and 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Source  Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min.  Max. 
        
Voter turnout at the 2001 
Parliament elections   
Ministry of 
the Interior 
8,068 0.798 0.107 0.049  1 
1991 Population (Census)  National 
Stat. Inst. 
8,100 7,009.6  42,450.26 31 2,775,250 
Voter turnout at the 1994 
Parliament elections   
Ministry of 
Interior 
8,068 0.843 0.105 0.203  1 
South  National 
Stat. Inst. 
8,115 0.315 0.465  0  1 
Log GDP per capita in 1996  National 
Stat. Inst. 
8,115 9.533 0.422 8.107  10.359 
Share of employment in the 
non-profit sector in 1991 
National 
Stat. Inst. 







Table 2. Changes in local institutions as functions of the size of the municipality 
 
Size Changes 
1,000  Mayor’s and cabinet members’ wages  
3,000  Mayor’s and cabinet members’ wages / size of the council 
5,000  Mayor’s and cabinet members’ wages / inclusion in the Domestic Stability Pact 
10,000  Mayor’s, cabinet members’ and council members’ wages / size of the council / size of the cabinet 
15,000  Local electoral rules 
30,000  Mayor’s, cabinet members’ and council members’ wages / within-city neighborhood councils allowed 
50,000  Mayor’s and cabinet members’ wages 
100,000  Mayor’s and cabinet members’ wages / size of the council / size of the cabinet / within-city neighbourhood councils 
compulsory 
250,000  Mayor’s and cabinet members’ wages / size of the council / size of the cabinet 





Table 3. Balancing properties for the baseline covariates before the treatment: single equation 
estimates 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Var.:  South  Log GDP per capita  Share of employment in the 
non-profit sector in 1991 
Sample:  Full Restricted Full Restricted Full Restricted 
        
Treatment  0.019 0.037 0.014 0.018  0.228**  0.097 
  (0.030) (0.066) (0.024) (0.058) (0.088) (0.228) 
Constant  0.344** 0.354** 9.543** 9.544** 1.238** 1.251** 
  (0.011) (0.035) (0.008) (0.030) (0.031) (0.114) 
        
Observations  8,045 4,023 8,045 4,023 7,946 4,023 
R-squared  0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 





Table 4. Balancing properties for the baseline covariates: SUR estimates 
 
 (1)  (2) 
Sample: Full  Restricted 
    
South  0.019 0.037 
  (0.027) (0.065) 
Log GDP per capita  0.014 0.018 
  (0.025) (0.060) 
Share of employees in the no-profit sector in 1991  0.228 0.097 
  (0.161) (0.238) 
    
Observations  7,946 4,023 

2   4.62 1.58 
p-value  0.202 0.663 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  
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Table 5. The effect of local electoral rules on voter turnout: baseline results  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Polynomial of:  Degree 0  Degree 1  Degree 2  Degree 3  Degree 4 
       
Treatment  0.022** 0.022** 0.021** 0.016**  0.012* 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant  0.796** 0.796** 0.796** 0.798** 0.800** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
Observations  8,017 8,015 8,015 8,015 8,015 
R-squared  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 





Table 6. The effect of local electoral rules on voter turnout: robustness 
 











       
Treatment  0.013** 0.035*  0.007  0.004  -0.007 
  (0.005) (0.014) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Constant  0.415** 0.772** 0.847** 0.786** 0.832** 
  (0.036) (0.008) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
       
Observations  7,919 4,004 8,011 7,391  624 
R-squared  0.34 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. In this table the 
results are from the same specification as in Table 5, Column 5. Figure 1. Population density around the threshold 
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Figure 2. The effect of local electoral rules on voter turnout 
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